Abstract-This work develops a new basis for evaluating the reliability benefits of diverse software, based on fault injection testing. In particular, the work investigates forms of argumentation that could be used to justify diversity as a basis for the construction of safety claims. Failure distributions of two versions of diverse software under various fault conditions are revealed separately by fault injection methods, and then the common failure probability of the version-pair can be estimated. The approach is justified theoretically, and cross validated with other work. This method is also used to explain the fundamental influence of failure distributions on diversity.
INTRODUCTION
Use of multiple redundant trains of equipment is a key method for achieving reliability in critical systems built from hardware. The presence of common software in such trains introduces possibilities for common cause failure which defeat this approach. Thus software diversity has the potential to play a central role in the design of defences against failures in safety critical systems built with redundant trains, by reducing the scope for common cause failures. Diversity design aims to build multiple different versions of a program fulfilling the same requirement specifications, in the hope that any remaining faults in the versions exhibit different failures, in terms of both failing on different inputs or failing differently on common inputs [1] . This is possible in principle since a common requirement can be implemented in different ways, e.g. using different functions, structures or languages etc., leading to differences in the remaining faults and failure patterns. However, diversity measurement remains an open topic i.e. the level of reliability gain resulting from the use of software diversity is unknown. An immediate practical consequence of this is that it is difficult for safety cases to claim any formal benefits resulting from the use of diversity in multiversion safety critical systems. A corollary is that it is not clear how to design diverse software for reducing the possibility of common failures, other than to use diverse development processes and make the software versions 'different' from each other.
Given the fact that current development methods cannot ensure fault-free software, fault tolerant techniques are used extensively in practise. These are based on diverse behavior directly (N-version programs) or indirectly (e.g. extra diagnostic or recovery functions), and are especially important in safety-critical systems [1] . Safety standards usually require a form of warranty to be made for any application of software built for use in safety-related applications such as those used in the nuclear, medicine and aerospace sectors [2, 3] . Ideally, the arguments in the safety cases constructed to satisfy this, would demonstrate the high reliability required for these systems in a quantitative scientific way. In fact, the state of the art is that the diversity design can be used only as a qualitatively beneficial defence for common cause failures. The associated safety cases can not quantify the reliability enhancement achieved because there is no theoretical model to assess the reliability implications of diversity between two or more particular program versions. One major reason for this is the low chance of observing real failure behaviours in high reliability safety-critical systems, so there is insufficient empirical evidence to arrive at any conclusion regarding guidelines for design and assessment, or support any measurement-based estimation models.
One approach to this problem uses fault injection (FI) to evaluate diverse version behaviours [4] . Such an approach attempts to establish the relationship between faults and failure behaviours and the reliability characteristics of diverse software versions [5] . Fault simulation has been developed to evaluate software by deliberately injecting faults into a system or a copy (such as a prototype or a simulation), to observe the effects of these faults on the system behaviour [6, 7] . Various software fault injection techniques have been employed [8, 9, 10] .
Probabilistic models do exist to describe general properties of diversity over populations of programs, such as those of Eckhardt and Lee (EL) [11] , and Littlewood and Miller (LM) [12] , but these models do not yield diversity measures in particular cases, or depend upon parameters that are very difficult to estimate. The EL and LM models attempt to describe what is true 'on average' for a large population of programs. Subsequently, an online collection of programs has been used for demonstrating the LM model [13] . In Meulen and Revilla's (MR) experiments [14] , thousands of programs have been gathered for one common specification. Although the program structure is too simple, and the number of developed versions far too great, to represent any kind of realistic practice, some general diversity phenomena have been observed and discussed. This paper aims to formulate a failure distribution (FD) model to reveal the diversity between two particular software versions in a more formal way than is currently possible. The FD model is a development of the fault injection approach to estimate software diversity based on a statistical distribution of software failures over the input space. It is being developed as a theoretical framework to support the eventual use of fault injection for diversity claims within future system safety cases. The approach of the FD-model is cross validated with both the LM-model and the MR-experiment in this paper. The paper also identifies various key factors that influence safety claims inferred from failure-distribution experiments. Finally, it explains how the range of possible failure distributions caused by faults appear to be circumscribed, and why this may be an important feature in the analysis of software diversity.
II. FAILURE DISTRIBUTION MODEL

A. Diversity Quantification
The concept of diversity in software engineering has been conceived to evaluate the benefits of software constructed by multiple functional branches all designed to achieve the same task. These branches are called components, divisions, versions or channels etc in different applications. They are expected to show diverse failure behaviours. Then a voting mechanism compares the outputs from the versions to reduce the risk of failures affecting system level operation. There is still no wellrecognised quantitative index capturing diversity directly as a system property. The effect of diversity is commonly characterised through a comparative reliability improvement. Software Reliability is generally defined as the probability of failure-free software operation for a specified period of time in a specified environment [15] . Denoting the failure probability and reliability of software as P and R respectively, P R 1 follows and is used throughout this paper.
For a multiple version software system, the common failure probability (CFP) between versions (or channels) is the key parameter required to calculate the system reliability. For example, in some situations detection of a dangerous condition by 1-out-of-2 channels within a 2 channel protection system is deemed sufficient to shut down an industrial process. Hence system failure under this situation is the inability of both channels to recognise a dangerous plant condition (hence the '1-out-of-2' system definition), and the CFP gives the system reliability R directly.
The long-standing issue in diversity quantification is that the CFP of multiple versions can not be simply deduced directly from the single failure probabilities (SFP) of each version. This paper studies 1-out-of-2 systems, but the conclusion can be extended to general 1-out-of-n voting systems. For a 1-out-of-2 system with versions A and B, the issue is to estimate CFP AB P from SFPs A P and B P of the version pair respectively.
One way to proceed with a 1-out-of-2 system would be to assume the statistically independent failures model (IFP) for the CFP:
on the grounds that two versions were 'developed independently'. However, the IFP has been discovered as often resulting in an unsafe (optimistic) estimate. The investigations identified that CFP is decided by not only the failure rates of two versions/channels individually, but also by the correlation of the failure behaviours [11] . Approaches to elucidate failure correlation explore how and why the versions may fail commonly on some points of the same input space with a greater than average probability. This issue was identified in the early studies of diversity [1, 16] .
B. CFP definition
The definition of failure probability P in this paper is based on the concept of software input space. Assuming software developed to a requirement specification has a finite input space : which contains Z N input points i Then the software failure probability P is:
Where ) ( i U Z is operational/user profile: the probability that an input i Z is selected at a random point in software operation [17] .
The two versions of a program A and B are developed according to the common requirement specification, which means both versions also have the same input space : . Similarly defining a sign function and failure probability A P and B P for both A and B:
The common failure probability AB P for version A and B is:
Comparing (3), (4) and (5), it is easy to see that the IFP B A AB P P P does not necessarily apply to a particular versionpair, even if the version pair has been created 'independently', e.g. with different teams, source code and languages etc. The IFP might intuitively be expected to describe the behavior of a random version pair from a population containing all possible pairs. However, empirical evidence showed that a CFP obeying the IFP is unrealistic in practical applications [1] . A plausible speculation is that there is some amount of deterministic control over the failure domains in software development, so for a particular program the failure distribution over the input space is not fully known, but it is not statistically random: e.g. the basic functional tests used during software development ensure that all versions share some known common success areas in the input space. The three cases represent:
x no-overlapping: maximum diversity, x totally-overlapping: no diversity, x orthogonal failure domains between version A and B.
In the 3 rd case, the diversity satisfies the IFP model.
C. Previous diversity models
For equation (5) to be useful in determination of CFP, requires knowledge of the software behaviours on every input. Exhaustive test is an impossible task for most systems, so development of practical diversity evaluation models must use estimation of ) ( i Z T rather than complete test results.
Two well-known diversity models use ) ( i Z T to examine version correlation: the EL model and the LM model. In the EL model, the randomness present in the development process was modelled as a random selection of a program 3 from the set of 3 N possible program versions that 'could' be developed to the same requirement specification, and the probability of selecting a particular version S was denoted as ) (
S 3
S
, where the capital letter and small letter are used to distinguish a random variable and its given value. The operational or usage (having same meaning in this paper) profile of a random input X to any program can still be described by :
. Then the average probability of a program version failing on a given input x is defined as a "difficulty function" ) (x T since it reflects a property of x averaged across the population of possible program versions:
In ( 
The equation (7) describes the probability of a randomly chosen program failure on a random input point. The CFP of a 1-out-of-2 system formed from programs A 3 and B 3 therefore is:
where () cov x is standard covariance function that defines the version correlation. The . Correspondingly, a CFP for the 1-out-of 2 system by A 3 and B 3 based on LM model is:
In the LM model (9), the correlation term
can be either positive or negative, and there is still a possibility that the IFP applies for some versionpairs.
The analytic approach of the EL and LM models successfully explains some practical phenomena and theoretical features of software diversity, but they do not yield a method of diversity estimation for real programs. The problem is that the only estimate for the CFP of a particular program pair is the average CFP of the program population which the version-pair were randomly selected from, i.e., the difficulty function
was estimated by its average value over the population. For example, at each point x in the input space, if the probability of selecting a particular version S was uniform, (6) is simply the number of failed versions failed N divided by the total number of program versions in the population:
D. Failure Distribution (FD) Model
The EL/LM models provided a theoretical way to describe the statistical relationship between random factors in the development process and the CFP. Based on the selection of a version-pair from one or two large populations of programs, the necessity to look beyond the independence assumptions was clarified. But for real applications, especially in the case of estimation for safety-critical systems, it is impossible to generate the program population, both in principle (because there is no mechanism for deciding which programs are in the population and which excluded) and in practise due to the effort that would be required to build a large enough population. Furthermore, it is implausible to argue that real development corresponds to random selection of a pair from a program pool or pools.
The factors driving CFP include three main types:
x fault planting Fault creation occurs at every stage and in every aspect of the development process, e.g., in requirements, design or coding, and due to tool bugs or human errors;
x failure triggering When software contains faults, the failure occurrences can still be random because specific conditions, e.g. certain system configurations or input sequences, are required to trigger a fault, and there is randomness in condition occurrence.
x fault to failure propagation This is a structural feature, in the sense that the software architecture decides the propagation route from a fault to corresponding failures, which in turn determines the locations of failures in its input space.
Statistical modelling can in principle describe the random factors analytically, and parameterizing and refining these factors will provide improved routes to assessment. For example, the operational profile ) (x U has been introduced in various reliability models to handle the relative frequencies of inputs [18] . As another example, the EL and LM models use a random parameter 3 to describe the uncertainty in both software structures and residual faults, i.e. through random selection of the version from a program pool. However, for a given version pair, the software architectures are deterministic, which admits a different problem construction. For a particular program, assume that all possible faults form a set of size F N (that can be infinite without impacting the following analytic results). 'A fault' in the set can be a condition corresponding to a single anomaly or combination of anomaly(ies) in software. Then the uncertainty associated with a program's correctness lies in the likelihood of it containing elements of the fault set. Denote this uncertainty using a variable F representing the program containing a random fault from the set i.e. under a random faulty condition. The occurrence probability of a specific faulty condition f is denoted as ) ( f F H , which is introduced in a role similar to the operational profile of inputs. Then the average probability ) (x T of a program version failing on a given input x :
is similar to the modified sign function in (1), and whose range has only two values: 0 when the program with a fault f performs successfully on the input x , otherwise: 1.
An input triggering a fault to cause a failure can be defined as a failure point under the faulty condition. Then ) (x T can be defined as a failure distribution (FD) function: it indicates the probability that an input x in the input space is a failure point under a random faulty condition.
Similarly, the failure distribution functions
for version A and B respectively can be obtained from (11) . The failure probability of a particular program A S is:
And for a particular program B S , there is:
The CFP of a particular pair of versions A S and B S as a 1-out-of-2 system is:
The FD model (14) describes correlation of fault-failure propagations between two given software architectures, and then calculates the probability of a version-pair failing coincidentally at a random input under a random faulty condition (the fault is from the fault population and occurrence frequency). An advantage of the FD model is that a fault population can be constructed in practise, using fault injection testing [19] . The software structures affect diversity because the fault-failure propagation varies between versions. For example, an identical code segment appearing in two versions might contain exactly the same fault (in the sense of incorrect code), but the propagation of the fault to their failures can differ because of the code diversity in the remaining code of the two versions. Fault injection techniques disclose these relations by attempting to simulate all possible faulty conditions. This seems to cause a problem similar to the population of programs in the EL/LM models, since the number of possible faults is infinite. However, the statistical calculation in FD model can be based on identification of failure regions rather than fault sets: and empirical results give some initial indications that the failure patterns in a program's input space may be finite. If the definition of variables F and f is changed to refer to failure patterns, the use of the FD model can be applied (although the frequency of failure occurrence needs to be determined differently).
The difference between the FD model (14) and EL/LM models lies in the construction of populations for the statistical calculations of ) (x T : they are based on a fault set and a programme set, respectively. Whilst injecting faults effectively generates a set of programs, it is a more restricted set than that envisaged in the EL/LM conceptual approach; the program set resulting from injection is more specific to the program pair under test. Thus the two approaches reveal different attributes of a system with diversity design. Numerically, FD and EL/LM models may produce the same results under some special conditions:
x For the FD model, defining the number of the faults that cause a version to fail at an input x as failed N , then
x If we make the two populations the same (the program pool for the EL/ML model is defined to be the collection of programs formed by injecting faults in two particular versions), then we have
, and the equations (10) and (15) give the same numerical result.
III. APPLICATIONS OF THE FD MODEL
A. Failure Distribution (FD) model in Safety Cases
To claim benefits from fault-tolerance or any high reliability designs in safety-critical system applications, a safety case is built [20, 21] . The motivation for developing an empirical fault injection method to assess attributes of multiversion software is clear: little direct statistical evidence is available to describe failure behaviors of high-reliability software. However, the use of such an approach in safety cases requires theoretical and practical validation. The FD model is a step along that path, providing a theoretical foundation for estimation of common failure probability in multiversion software. The advantage of seeking a basis for a fault injection approach is that, unlike the EL/LM approach, it can be used in principle to build a method of measurement of diversity for two or more software versions.
The FD model is measure-based. The CFP requires the failure distributions of both versions for all possible faults with size smaller than the SFPs. In practical testing, this simulation of faults can be implemented by sieving faults according to the SFP that they cause. Another question concerns the number of faults to use for simulation. Empirical observations show that the number of failure patterns in the input space of software is finite and practically manageable, so exhaustive searching of failure patterns is conjectured to be a useful FI stop criterion when using [13] .
Based on 1-out-of-2 multiversion systems, the FD model formalizes how to evaluate the expectation of common CFP for a multiversion system constructed by two versions whose SFPs are known, and equivalently it can demonstrate how it may be possible to argue high reliability based on diverse two version software with lower reliability. There is an important open question for safety cases, for which the FD model shows promise:
x The system is constructed from two diverse versions A and B with their SFPs less than a specified small value A P and B P respectively, what is expected for its CFP?
x In the language of safety cases, can a required SIL4 system defined in IEC61508 be constructed by two different SIL3 channels [22]?
The answers, based on the FD model, involve two steps:
x Use of fault injection to find out the failure distribution
for all faults with size smaller than A P and B P respectively.
x Estimation of CFP based on (14), using Fig. 1 gives a simple but direct visualization that diversity is fundamentally determined by the actual distributions of the failure points in the common input space for two particular versions. The orthogonal relation of failure regions is a special case where IFP is applicable to a 1-out-of-2 system. Based on the EL model that define a "difficulty" as a probability of an input causing a software failure (due to software functions handling different inputs needing different 'effort' to implement, and therefore having different chances to contain bugs), the IFP describes two randomly chosen versions only if their difficulty distributions are uniform i.e. a situation where the failures for both versions have same chance to happen randomly anywhere in the input space. But some characteristics of software development can limit the statistical randomness needed for IFP, i.e. the common requirement specification drives the two versions towards similarity of fault-failure propagation relations; and, common functional tests reduce the areas where failures can possibly happen. The FD model can be used to explain more clearly the role of failure distributions in diversity analysis. 
B. Diversity under Varied Failure Distributions
This result shows that the independence model, in considering equal failure probability over the entire input space is optimistic for diversity estimation where the two versions are known with certainly to have some common successful input sets i.e. in nearly all realistic situations, due to testing.
This preliminary analysis has some implications, for example, suggesting that Statistical Testing of diverse software versions might benefit from use of different test sets for the different versions. Use of a common test set will reduce the randomness and therefore the theoretical diversity demonstrations.
C. Partition of Failure Distributions
Equations (16) and (17) show that, in general, the IFP can not be used to estimate the CFP if the failure distribution is uneven over the whole input space. However, the independence condition may still exist on the input subsets when ) (x 
It is easy to prove: The equation (20) provides a simplified method to estimate diversity if the input space can be divided into parts with constant failure densities, a condition that is satisfied when there is limited number of failure patterns.
IV.CROSS VALIDATION OF THE FD MODEL USING AN EXAMPLE
A. Background
An online programming competition made it possible to collect a population of programs large enough to use the EL/LM models [13] . The MR experiment [14] , used thousands of programs developed by different competitors to solve a single simple mathematical problem, and gives some statistical features of the faults and failures observed from the test results. Although the general conclusions may not apply to real systems, the experiment did demonstrate the process of the diversity model application.
The FD model assesses particular version pairs by evaluating each version's possible failure behaviors. A FI approach makes this measurement possible on any particular version pair, as illustrated on diversity assessment of a protection system [4] .
An example in this section is constructed for the purposes of FD model and EL/ML model cross-validation, and demonstrating some advantages of the FD model in explaining diversity phenomena. The implementation required three steps:
A pair of programs Va and Vb is developed according
to the common requirement specification for the "3n+1" mathematical issue in the MR experiment [14] .
FI testing is carried out on the version pair:
a. select, or provide a method of generating, representative faults (see below) for the two programs b. iterate the step of inserting a fault into a program and detecting its failure behaviors c. the stopping criteria of the iteration is exhaustive testing of all faults or when no more new failure pattern appears. (This is a key potential source of uncertainty, which will be discussed later in more detail)
3. The FD model (14) is used to calculate the diversity ( reliability improvement).
The application of the FD model requires three parameters: operational profile, fault occurrence profile and the sign function for failure points. The former two are ideally obtained empirically but subjective judgments are unavoidable in most realistic situations. The third parameter is found through FI tests. To assess Va and Vb and compare against the MR results, the parameters are determined as below:
x Possible faults and failure regions:
The number of possible faults for FI testing may be huge, but instead 'representative' faults can be used in the practical implementation for this case, using a simplification based on an empirical observation in the MR experiment. Although thousands of different faults were detected in the programs, only 20 failure patterns were identified (with labels as a to t in table 2 in the appendix. Similarly, the MR experiment categorized all the detected faults into 37 equivalence classes (with labels as EC0 to EC37 in table 1 in appendixes). Any fault injected from the MR fault set into Va or Vb will cause one of the 20 patterns, and any fault belonging to one of the 37 categories can be mapped to one of the 20 patterns. A premise of the MR experiment is that the fault set is in some way representative or adequate, and we will use that same premise. The ) , ( x f Q in (11) can be obtained based on the failure patterns for both versions.
x Fault occurrence frequency and operational profile.
for the cross-validation can be obtained from the MR data: the MR experiment operation profile can be used and the frequency of representative faults and propagation of the fault-failure can be obtained from table 1 in the appendix. The determination of operational profiles has been discussed in applications of statistical models for failure probability estimation [17] . The fault frequency is empirical evidence in this MR example, but in general will not be available, and the assessment will have to be made on the basis of an agreed assumption about how to distribute fault frequencies for the purposes of assessment. However, for the purposes of comparison with MR results, the fault frequency can be calculated from the MR program population.
The above discussion shows that the data required by FD models to assess the Va and Vb pair can all be deduced from the MR results. Therefore this example of cross validation is based on the consideration of a virtual version pair Va and Vb, containing all the types faults (or failure patterns) found in the MR experiments. Comparing a real estimation of a given version pair to the one of the virtual pair, the only difference would be on the selection of representative faults and their occurrence frequencies.
B. Comparisons of the models
Cross validation of the models proceeds by comparing the results regarding reliability improvement (RI). No specific metric exists for software diversity and alternative measures are normally based on the RI. For example, a RI index for the 1-out-of-2 system may be } , min{ / One of the main observations in the MR experiment described the influence of fault sizes on software diversity. A single common large population of programs was defined for the selection of a version pair, so B A P P and have the same value: the average failure rate (AFR) over the version population. The RI is AFR P AB / in this case. Correspondingly for the cross-comparison, the FD model uses the AFR of the version over the fault set. The procedure in MR experiment was to remove the most unreliable program from the program pool each time to reduce the AFR of the program population, then to observe the change of RI. Accordingly a FD experiment simulates the process by removing faults in the fault set progressively according to their size from big to small (in order of the failure rate i.e. from top to bottom in the first column of table 1 in the appendix), then generates a corresponding result as fig. 2 . Two RI to AFR relations are displayed in the fig. 2: 1. the dash line shows what happens when common failure probability obeys the IFP model, and is a straight line (RI is the inverse of AFR), included for purposes of comparison.
2. the solid line is based on the FD model. The result essentially repeats that in the MR experiment [14] , but with unnoticeable differences because of using 4943 (rather than 5897 originally used) as the total number of programs to get the P(F) in table1 of the appendix. This different number is obtained by readding up the different programs according to the data introduced in the paper.
This example was not concerned with the practical procedure for implementing the fault injection to identify failure patterns. The aim was to use the MR results to show how the FD model explains diversity behaviors in a different way. The source data required by the FD model do not use identical formats with that in the MR experiment, so the above results primarily validate the data regenerated from the MR experimental results for use in FD model, and demonstrate the feasibility and procedure of using the FD model to assess the average diversity of a particular program pair based on fault injection testing. Given the common definition of a program population including operating conditions, the FD model can produce an equivalent diversity assessment to the EL/LM model from a same testing process, providing a simple cross validation of the two models.
The FD model can also be used to produce different results from those in the MR experiment, enhancing insight into diversity phenomena. Concerning the RI-AFR relation, one observation from the MR results is that pairs comprising lower reliability versions tend to show a RI closer to the IFP model (solid line is closer to the dash line for higher AFR in the figure 2, producing a more desirable RI). This trend was explained as being dominated by fault sizes. However the FD model can be used to show that that reliability improvement by diversity in particular version pairs is fundamentally influenced by failure patterns and does not have a simple relationship with SFP (i.e. AFR, because the average failure probability of the population was used to represent the SFP) . A special case was designed for this purpose: the failure patterns were removed one by one from bottom to top according to the sequence in the first column of table 1 (from small faults to big faults). The corresponding result is shown in fig. 3 .
In contrast to the conclusion from MR-experiment in fig. 2 , it can be seen that a pair comprising more reliable programs is closer to the IFP model in terms of RI. The best pair can even achieve a level of diversity equivalent to that produced by the independence model. This simple study of the same program pool (or fault set) demonstrates that the average SFP of the pool is not the essential factor influencing reliability improvement by diversity. The phenomenon in figure 3 illustrates the influence of the failure patterns on diversity. In (17) , the diversity is mainly decided by the size of the possible area for failure distribution in an input space. Under the simplified conditions, the ratio between CFP and IFP is
In fig. 3 , the average SFP was decreasing by removing the fault set one by one, but the possible failure areas remained as the whole input space (because the failure pattern (f) with 100% failure rate is included). The density of failure distribution was tending to uniform and ¦ : U x x X P ) ( =1 for the manipulated pool after the final removal, which resulted in the diversity measure fitting the independence model.
V. DISCUSSION
Both EL/LM and FD models study diversity based on the consideration of statistically averaged failure behaviors:
x EL/LM considers all possible programs designed to a common requirement specification.
x FD considers a particular program-pair under all potential faulty conditions.
It has been shown how the FD model can be described using the theoretical foundations developed for EL/LM models, but is more specific to particular program pairs, and has potential for development into a practical diversity measurement method.
In practical application of the FD model based on fault injection, the major difficulties will be the selection of all possible faulty conditions and determination of fault occurrence frequency. However, the empirical observations of limited failure patterns may help to reduce the burden, allowing the use of representative faults rather than all them. One approach to constructing representative faults uses simulated anomalies at all branch joints of data and control flows that influence where failures occur in an input space. The selection of the joints is a top-down approach: from the linkages of big functional component/units to small ones. Such approach can indicate the occurrence profile of failure patterns for faulty conditions at specific locations in the software structure.
This work has focused on cross-validation of the FD model and its use to explain diversity phenomena. The practical use of the FD model requires other research questions to be overcome. For example, the proposed FI criterion to stop inserting faults is that no new failure patterns would be revealed under the simulated faulty condition. However, there is no way to know this for sure and the possibility of neglecting some failure patterns in FI testing can not be excluded. Uncertainty analyses can help to estimate and confine its influence on diversity assessment, e.g., assuming representativeness of selected faults, the weight of any neglected failure patterns in the profile of faulty condition is calculable reduces as the number of tested faults increases; also the building of test set plus stress tests can be used to check if the failure patterns cover branches of data/control flow and entire input space. Nevertheless, the systematic identification of failure patterns remains an open research question.
A high variety of failure patterns becomes a benefit and key factor in diversity design as shown mathematically in III.B and illustrated empirically in IV.B. Potentially in practical design, it can be used to enhance diversity through choice/adjustment of software structure. However, this must be balanced against the possibility that complex structures raise the risk of introducing more faults. The balance between these two phenomena needs to be better understood.
In the MR experiment, most failure patterns were caused by big faults, and 14 out of 20 have a failure rates higher than 40%. These big faults play a major role in the statistical analysis. The experiment used only 2500 demands/inputs so the test results did not really reveal the realistic situation of failure behaviors for small faults (for example, where the SFP ). The low SFPs (<1/2500) in both the MR and FD experiments were results of averaging over a large population of programs with high variation (including faultfree and totally-failed programs). The question remains as to whether the conclusions drawn from these observations are relevant to real software with high reliability.
In the application of fault injection to assessment of software diversity, sieving of faults based on (failure probability) size can be used to study software with high reliability requirements. However, the determination of appropriate fault profiles remains an open question. This issue introduces uncertainty similar to that introduced in the determination of operational/usage profile in software reliability testing. One potentially promising way forward would be to estimate the sensitivity of the diversity assessment to these uncertainties.
VI. CONCLUSION
A model to assess software diversity based on fault injection test has been constructed and compared against existing models and a diversity experiment in the literature. It is proposed as a potential basis for a new form of safety argument to be used in software safety cases. The new model has been used to explain the influence on diversity of failure distributions over the input space.
To use the model in a safety case it would be necessary to devise a different form of argument to those that are accepted currently. The argument is that if two devices (or software versions) show diversity for all the possible failure patterns, it will show diversity with a high probability for any random set of real faults under the same conditions. If convincing evidence for determining potential faults and fault occurrence frequencies can be determined to support this argument, it will become reasonable to make a diversity claim as part of safety engineering (and hence claim improvement in the reliability of a multi-version system over its constituent single versions). Further use of experience in other mutation test applications is required to find a practical approach to judge the representativeness and the adequacy of fault selections. The applicability of the FD model depends on the application problem e.g. some special diversity designs, such as those designed to defend against specific common cause failures, will make it easier to specify faulty conditions. Future work should include sensitivity analysis to bound reliability improvement claims due to the uncertain factors in the FD application process.
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[ The mapping relations of the fault-types to the faultpatterns identified by MR experiment are listed as the third column in table 1. The failure patterns for all 37 classes of faults are covered by the 20 1-0 matrices in table 2. In the MR experiment, the occurrences of all 37 faults from EC0 to EC 37 in the thousands programs have been recorded. This information can be converted to give frequencies for each fault, which can be summed to give frequencies for each failure pattern (the fourth column in table 1) The last row in MR-table gives a total number of programs by C language as 5897. The actual sum from the table in MR paper is 4943 and used here for this calculation.
